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Abstrat
We onsider the proess of opinion formation in a soiety of interating agents, where there is a set B
of soially aepted rules. In this senario, we observed that agents, represented by simple feed-forward,
adaptive neural networks, may have a onservative attitude (mostly in agreement with B) or liberal attitude
(mostly in agreement with neighboring agents) depending on how muh their opinions are inuened by
their peers. The topology of the network representing the interation of the soiety's members is determined
by a graph, where the agents' properties are dened over the vertexes and the inter-agent interations are
dened over the bonds. The adaptability of the agents allows us to model the formation of opinions as
an on-line learning proess, where agents learn ontinuously as new information beomes available to the
whole soiety (on-line learning). Through the appliation of statistial mehanis tehniques we dedued a
set of dierential equations desribing the dynamis of the system. We observed that by slowly varying the
average peer inuene in suh a way that the agents attitude hanges from onservative to liberal and bak,
the average soial opinion develops a hysteresis yle. Suh hystereti behavior disappears when the variane
of the soial inuene distribution is large enough. In all the ases studied, the hange from onservative to
liberal behavior is haraterized by the emergene of onservative lusters, i.e. a losed knitted set of soiety
members that follow a leader who agrees with the soial status quo when the rule B is hallenged.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this artile we present a model for the proess of opinion formation in rational individuals,
interating with a soial irle of peers in a soiety with a pre-existent set of rules that determine
what is soially aeptable. Our objetive is to better understand observed phenomena suh as the
emergene and stability of opinion onsensus [13℄, the soial segregation through opinion polarization
[46℄, hystereti soial behavior, opinion lustering and other phenomena related to properties of bi-
stability of the opinion formation proess [79℄, amongst others.
We propose a model with the following harateristis:
1. The model onsiders a mehanism for rational agents to assimilate information and update
their opinions. The agents are expliitly adaptive.
2. The model onsiders the existene of a set of rules B that determine what is soially aeptable.
We assume the existene of a funtioning soiety prior the beginning of the opinion formation
proess.
3. The model onsiders the interation of the agents with their neighbors [10, 11℄, with a strength
proportional to the redibility of the neighbors, their number and their proximity to the agent.
If by rational we mean Bayesian, two non-interating agents should, if the information about a soial
issue is omplete, reah the same opinion, disregarding their initial priors ([1℄, Theorem 1). Therefore,
a model of the opinion formation proess of rational agents in a funtioning soiety must onsider
inter-agent interations as means to support the emergene of dierent soial positions.
The meta-agent B determines what is soially aeptable by assigning one out of two possible
values (good or bad) to soial issues risen in the soiety. Modeling opinions with binary variables
is onsistent with the observation that most people opt for one out of two opposite positions while
answering questions with high soial impat ([7℄ and referenes therein). In mathematial terms, B is
a lassier that assigns labels σB ∈ {±1}, to soial instanes odied in binary messages S of length
N, i.e. S ∈ {±1}N [5℄. In order to keep a balane between sophistiation and analytial tratability,
we hoose to represent the meta-agent B as a pereptron [12℄ with an internal representation B ∈ RN ,
that lassies N-tuples S through the rule σB(S) = sgn(B ·S), where B ·S ≡
∑N
i=1BiSi is the usual
inner produt in RN , sgn(x) = 1 if x > 0, -1 if x < 0 and 0 if x = 0. By hoosing a pereptron as a
representative of B, we are singling out a partiular diretion in spae, B, whih makes the proess
of opinion formation anisotropi.
By onsisteny we hoose to model the agents {a} by pereptrons with internal representations{
Ja ∈ RN
}
. The set of soial rules B, whih are assumed to be the produt of loal history, are
onsidered to be onstant, thus B does not hange over time. Ja, the agent's internal representation,
is a plasti quantity that hanges to assimilate new available information.
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The use of pereptrons to model soial agents has been done within the framework of moral
foundation theory [13, 14℄. Our approah diers from these in the fat that we onsider the existene
of a funtioning soiety represented by B. By onsidering a supervised, on-line learning senario [12℄
to adapt the agent-pereptrons to the information reeived from the soiety B and from the other
agents [15℄, we an mimi the opinion formation proess in an environment where individual opinions
are formed under loal (through the neighborhood) and global (through the soiety) inuenes.
In order to onstrut the equations that rule the dynamis of the proess and to make sense of the
information provided by a large number of interating agents, we use statistial mehanis tehniques,
whih have been suessfully applied in soially inspired problems for the last three deades ([16℄
and referenes therein).
II. THE LEARNING ALGORITHM
By the very nature of soiety, soial agents are inuened by others in possibly many dierent
ways. In our model, we onsider two levels of soial pressure exerted on the individual agents: from
the soiety as a whole, and from the agent's loal neighborhood [10, 17, 18℄.
The organization of agents and neighborhoods an be modeled through a direted graph G =
{{a}, {ga,b}} where {a} is a set of vertexes assoiated with the soial agents and {ga,b} is a set of
strengths ga,b that represent the inuene of agent b on agent a. Clearly, there is no need to assume
reiproity (ga,b 6= gb,a) and ga,b ≥ 0 where ga,b = 0 implies that agent b is not in the neighborhood
of a, Na = {c|ga,c > 0}.
Given that the soial agents are represented by pereptrons, we propose a supervised, on-line
learning senario, where agents learn ontinuously as new information beomes available [12, 19℄,
to mimi the opinion formation proess. The information a reeives is taken from the set S ≡
{(σB,n, σNa,n,Sn), n = 1, . . . , T}, where the issue Sn is presented at time n and then disarded (learn-
ing has to proeed on-line if there is only one training example available at any partiular time), σB,n
is the opinion of B on Sn (used as a referene to guide the learning proess in the partiular diretion
given by the supervisor 's vetor B) and σNa ≡ {σc|c ∈ Na} is the set of opinions of the neighbors of
a on S. The update equation for the internal representation of a is:
Ja,n+1 = Ja,n + ψa,n
σB,nSn√
N
, (1)
where σBS/
√
N is the (unit length) Hebb vetor, that indiates the diretion of the soially aeptable
position on Sn and ψa,n is the learning amplitude, that regulates how the information is inorporated
in the internal representation of a. The length of the opinion formation proess is T. Based on soial
orroboration experiments [4, 20, 21℄ and assuming that agent a is onneted with the agents in Na,
we propose ψa ≡ f |Ja|/
√
N Ψa where f is a units onstant, |Ja|/
√
N =
√∑N
j=1 J
2
a,j/N is a fator
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that has no impat on the learning eieny of the algorithm [22℄ and it has been only onsidered
for tehnial purposes and:
Ψa ≡ 1−Θ(−σBσa)
∑
c∈Na
ga,c
f
Θ(σaσc), (2)
where Θ(x) = 1 if x > 0 and 0 otherwise is the Heaviside step funtion. If the agent a is not
onneted (Na = ∅), it only learns from the soial rule B, thus Ja → B. If Na 6= ∅, then the learning
amplitude (2) is ψa ∝ f if σa = σB or ψa ∝ f − ga,c1 − . . .− ga,cm, if a disagrees with B and agrees
with some of its neighbors ci ∈ {c ∈ Na|σa = σc}. Observe that if a disagrees with B the added
eet of a's agreeing neighbors ould make Ja grow in opposite diretion to B.
A. The learning equations
When the number of examples in the training set S is large (T →∞) the state of the soiety an
be assessed by measuring the overlaps between synapti vetors:
Ra ≡ Ja ·B|Ja||B| = cos(θa), (3)
where θa is the angle between B and Ja. Ra represents the level of agreement of agent a with the
soiety B. Similarly, the level of agreement between two agents an be represented by:
Wa,b ≡ Ja · Jb|Ja||Jb| = cos(γa,b) (4)
where γa,b is the angle between Ja and Jb. By dening the vetor Jc,⊥ = Jc − |B|−2(B · Jc)B whih
is the omponent of Jc in hyper-plane perpendiular to B, we an dene the overlaps:
Ya,b ≡ Ja,⊥ · Jb,⊥|Ja,⊥||Jb,⊥| = cos(ϕa,b), (5)
where ϕa,b is the angle between Ja,⊥ and Jb,⊥. The relationship between (3), (4) and (5) is:
Wa,b = RaRb + Ya,b
√
(1−R2a)(1−R2b). (6)
Ya,b represents the level of agreement between agents a and b on issues S0 that are soially neutral,
i.e. B · S0 = 0. Therefore, the state of the soiety an be desribed by the sets of overlaps {Ra},
dened on the vertexes and {Ya,b}, dened on the bonds of the graph G, to desribe the state of the
soiety.
The omponents of the issue vetors S are random variables with P(Sj = 1) = 12 . To average out
this disorder we dene the variables:
φa ≡ σB Ja · S|Ja| (7)
β ≡ σBB · S|B| (8)
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Figure 1: Pitorial representation of the synapti vetors B, Ja and Jb and the angles between them.
whih are the agent's and soiety's post-synapti elds respetively.
The data aessible to the agent a is (σB, φa, φNa,S) where φNa ≡ {φc|c ∈ Na}. With this
information we have to onstrut the equations for the opinion formation proess loal to agent a.
By dening the norm Qa ≡ Ja · Ja/N and from equation (1) we have that, disregarding terms of
O(f 2N−1):
1√
Qa,n+1
≃ 1√
Qa,n
(
1−Ψa,nφa,n f
N
)
. (9)
Using the denition of Qa,n and the expansion (9) we have that:
Ra,n+1 ≃ Ra,n +Ψa,n (βn − φa,nRa,n) f
N
. (10)
The length of the training set is T = αmaxN , whih implies that αmax = T/N. For a given number
1 ≤ n < N of examples presented to the pereptrons there is an 0 < α < αmax suh that n = α(n)N .
Observe that, given that the minimum inrement in the number of examples presented is 1, ∆α(n) ≡
α(n+ 1)− α(n) = 1/N . By dening ∆t ≡ f∆α = f/N we have that the equation for the evolution
of the overlap Ra is:
∆Ra
∆t
≃ Ψa (β − φaRa) +O(f). (11)
From (5), (3), (4), the denitions of Qa,n and ∆t we have that:
∆Ya,b
∆t
=
Ψa√
1−R2a
[
φb − Rbβ√
1− R2b
− Ya,bφa −Raβ√
1−R2a
]
+
+ITb,a +O(f), (12)
where ITb,a represents a term, idential to the rst one in (12) with the indexes a and b interhanged.
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In the limit ofN →∞ the overlaps {Ra} and {Ya,b} are self-averaging [23℄, thus limN→∞ 〈Ra〉 = Ra
and limN→∞ 〈Ya,b〉 = Ya,b. The partiular form the averages of the equations (11) and (12) have in the
large system (N →∞) optimal algorithm (f → 0) limit depend on the distribution P(β, {φa}), used
to ompute the expetation values represented by 〈·〉 . In the following we present dierent settings
where the distribution P(β, {φa}) aquires dierent forms.
1. Dimer
From the developments of the appendix A we have that in the ase of a soiety formed by only
two agents the equation for the vertex and bond overlaps are:
R˙a = (1−R2a)
2− ηa,b
2
+
+
ηa,b
2
[
(1−R2a)
ϕa,b
π
+ ρa,b (Rb −Wa,bRa)
]
(13)
Y˙a,b = (1− Y 2a,b)
[√
1− R2b
1−R2a
ηa,bρa,b + ITb,a
]
(14)
where ηc,d ≡ limf→0 gc,d/f and
ρa,b ≡ 1
2
− 1
π
arctan

 Ra −Wa,bRb√
(1− R2a)(1−R2b)(1− Y 2a,b)

 . (15)
The RHS of equation (14) is non-negative, thus the stable solution for this set of equations is Ya,b = 1,
whih implies total agreement between a and b on soially neutral issues. As a onsequene, equation
(15) beomes limYa,b→1 ρa,b = Θ(Rb −Ra). Thus
R˙a =
2− ηa,b
2
(1−R2a) +
+
ηa,b
2
Θ(Rb −Ra)(Rb −Wa,bRa). (16)
The equivalent equation for Rb an be obtained by interhanging subindexes a and b.
If agent a has a onservative attitude 2 > ηa,b (the adjetive onservative refers to the attitude
of an agent c for whih the soially aepted opinion σB weighs more than the opinion σd of its
neighbor, i.e. ηc,d < 2), the RHS of (16) is always positive and Ra → 1 asymptotially. Suppose that
Rb < Ra. By dening:
Kb ≡ 2− ηb,a [1−Θ(Ra − Rb)Ra]
ηb,aΘ(Ra − Rb)
√
1− R2a
, (17)
the stable solution of (16) at the urrent time is:
Rb,0 =
Kb√
1 +K2b
. (18)
If Ra = 1−εa, with 0 < εa ≪ 1, the root Rb,0 ≈ 1− 14η2b,aεa. Therefore, one agent with a onservative
attitude is suient to build up onsensus with the soiety.
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Suppose both agents have a liberal attitude, ηa,b, ηb,a > 2 and, without loss of generality, suppose
that Rb < Ra. As far as this inequality holds, Ra → −1 and Rb → Rb,0 given by (18). If the
relationship between agents hange, i.e. Ra < Rb at a posterior time, Rb → −1 and Ra → Ra,0
equivalent to the given in (18). In both ases the agents rathet their overlaps down, until their
respetive values of K, when well dened, beome negative. If the largest overlap is lose to -1,
the smallest is even loser. Clearly the only stable solution is Ra, Rb → −1 asymptotially and the
system gets polarized with respet to B.
B. Beyond the dimer
To go beyond the dimer we will onsider soieties with M2 members, organized on a graph G
without loops. This allows us to fatorize the global joint probabilities into fators involving pairs of
linked post-synapti eld variables, whih is onsistent with a desription where agents have aess
to loal information only.
To alulate the terms that appear in the equation for the overlaps Ya,b we observe that the loally
estimated eld β˜a an be deomposed into β˜a = β˜a,b+∆βa,b where β˜a,b is the estimation of B's post-
synapti eld inferred using only φa and φb and ∆βa,b is the orretion due to the other neighborhood
variables {φc|c ∈ Na, c 6= b} (see the omplete derivation in Appendix B). By disregarding the average
interation of the learning algorithm and these orretions, i.e. 〈Ψa∆βa,b〉 ∼ 0, the equation for the
overlap Ya,b beomes idential to (14). By making Ya,b = 1 [24℄, the opinion formation proess
beomes ontrolled by the expression (see appendix B):
R˙a ≤ (1− R2a)
(
1−
∑
c∈Na
ηa,c
2
)
+
+
∑
c∈Na
ηa,c
2
Θ(Rc − Ra)(Rc − RaWa,c)
whih is very similar to (16). As in the dimer ase, the equation that determines the opinion
formation proess onsists of two terms, the rst is an eetive learning from B, with an eetive
attitude given by
∑
c∈Na
ηa,c. The seond term is a perturbation formed by a linear superposition of
terms depending on the dierenes θa − θc.
III. THE DISORDER INTRODUCED THROUGH THE SOCIAL STRENGTHS
Let us assume that our model is redued to the set of equations:
R˙a = (1−R2a)
(
1−
∑
c∈Na
ηa,c
2
)
+
+
∑
c∈Na
ηa,c
2
Θ(Rc − Ra)(Rc −RaWa,c). (19)
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This ase is dierent from the dimer, given that there is more than one neighbor that ontributes to
the eetive attitude of the agent.
To better understand the role of the disorder introdued by the soial strengths we onsider the
ase where the ηa,c are drawn from a Gaussian distribution entered at η and with variane ∆
2
, i.e.
ηa,c ∼ N (ηa,c|η,∆2). η, the average soial strength, represents the average inuene neighbors have
on eah other and, in an indiret form, it also represents a level of disontent with B. The parameter
∆ ontrols the level of variation, or disorder, in the set of soial strengths.
Suppose the system is dened on a loop-free graph and where eah vertex has preisely n neighbors
(Cayley tree). Let us also assume that the system has been set with an average soial strength suh
that 2/(n− 1) > η > 2/n and small disorder ∆≪ η. It may our with probability:
P0 = H
(
nη − 2√
n∆
)
≪ 1
2
,
where H(x) ≡ ´∞
x
dy e−y
2/2/
√
2π is the Gardner error funtion, that a vertex o has a onservative
attitude 2 >
∑
c∈No
ηo,c, in whih ase, for times not smaller than a suiently large t0, Ro > Rb for
all b ∈ No. Clearly Ro → 1 and eah neighbor b of o will have a well dened Kb:
Kb ≡
2−∑c∈Nb ηb,c [1−Θ(Rc − Rb)Rc]∑
c∈Nb
ηb,cΘ(Rc − Rb)
√
1− R2c
(20)
and a stable solution Rb,0 = Kb/
√
K2b + 1. Observe that the probability:
P(Kb > 0) ≈ 1−H
(
2− (n− 1)η√
n− 1∆
)
, (21)
is lose to 1 and Rb → Rb,0 → 1. Assuming that the neighbors of onservative agents have an eetive
onservative attitude with a probability given by (21), the probability of a onservative luster with
a enter surrounded by ℓ onentri shells of neighbors is:
Pℓ ≈ P0
[
1− nℓH
(
2− (n− 1)η√
n− 1∆
)]
.
The largest luster size L is dened by PL = 0, that, for ∆≪ η sales like:
L ≈ ∆
2
0
∆2
+O(log∆).
Observe that both, the onstant ∆0 and the exponent of ∆, are determined by the topology of the
graph (Cayley tree in this ase). The onstant ∆0 is the maximum value of the disorder for whih
the system supports onservative lusters with a minimum size of L = 1. The largest number of
agents a onservative luster may have is M2, the whole population. If the luster overs the whole
system, L ∼ O(M) and the maximum value of the disorder for a system with a maximum possible
number of lusters equal to one is ∆m = ∆0/M
1/2.
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IV. EXPERIMENTS IN THE SQUARE LATTICE
In order to gauge the system's behavior we integrate the equations (19) up to an arbitrary long
time tmax, for a given set {ηa,c} of soial strengths on a soiety with M2 members and ompute the
following observable:
µ[{ηa,c}] ≡ 1
M2
∑
a
Ra(tmax). (22)
Ra(tmax) represents the level of agreement of agent a with B at the end of the learning proess of
length tmax, therefore µ, the magnetization, measures the soial agreement with B on the urrent
soial issue. Assuming that ηa,b ∼ N (ηa,b|η,∆2) and a graph with o-ordination number n, if nη <
2−3n∆ almost all agents have a onservative attitude∑c∈Na ηa,c < 2 that results on a onsensus with
B at the end of the learning proess Ra(tmax) ≈ 1. If we inrement η in δη ≪ ∆ and integrate the
system (19) again up to tmax, onsidering the initial ondition {Ra(0, η+ δη) = Ra(tmax, η)}, we may
observe a behavioral hange in those agents whih have suered a large enough inrement in their
attitude, beoming liberal
∑
c∈Na
ηa,c > 2, resulting on a redution of the overlap Ra(tmax) < 1. Suh
hanges may our, aording to the preditions of Setion III, after onservative lusters appear,
keeping the value of the magnetization lose to one even for values of nη > 2. Eventually, for values of
η suiently large, the system's magnetization saturates to a polarized state µ ≈ −1. The path bak
from polarized to onsensual behavior an be onstruted by starting with a large enough average
strength nη > 2 + 3n∆, a polarized initial ondition {Ra(0, η) = −1} and by reduing the average
strength η in steps δη ≪ ∆. Although there is only one stable solution to the system of equations
(19), the time it takes for the onservative lusters to emerge from a polarized initial ondition is
longer than the one it takes the system to reah the stable solution from the onsensual ondition
and, eetively, the path from a polarized to a onsensual behavior may appear idential to the
onsensual-to-polarized path, but shifted to the left.
To explore this phenomenon we perform a number of numerial integrations of the system (19),
dened over a M2 = 100× 100 square lattie with periodi boundary onditions. An agent is plaed
at eah vertex of the lattie and its neighborhood is form by its rst nearest neighbors (n = 4 for all
a). The system so onstruted forms an array R ∈ [−1, 1]M×M , with entries (R)j,k = Ra(j,k), where
a = j+(M −1)k. Although a square lattie is not a loop free graph, onsidering rst neighbors only
satises the ondition Na ∩ Nb = ∅ for any pair of agents a and b.
We integrate numerially the system (19) up to tmax = 100 time units using a seond order
Runge-Kutta method, with onsensual initial onditions {Ra(0) = 1}, for initial values of the average
strength η = 1
2
− 3∆, for various values of ∆. We expet this initial run to saturate at onsensus
µ ≈ 1. We slowly inremented η by an amount δη ∼ ∆/10 always taking as initial ondition the nal
onguration of the previous run {Ra(0, η + δη) = Ra(tmax, η)}, until reahing values of η suh that
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Figure 2: Hysteresis yle for a system with disorder parameter ∆ = 1.5 × 10−3. The square symbols
represent the µcp urve and the irles represent the µpc urve.
the system's nal magnetization reahes polarized saturation µ ≈ −1. The magnetization urve so
obtained represents the path from a onsensual to a polarized position with respet to B, µcp(η). We
take this nal (polarized) onguration as the initial onguration for the polarized to onsensual
path, that an be onstruted by reduing adiabatially η in amounts of δη. The magnetization urve
so obtained is labeled µpc(η).
We follow the evolution of the system by plotting µ as a funtion of the soial eld η for several
values of the disorder parameter 10−4 ≤ ∆ ≤ 10−1. For all the values of ∆ analyzed we found that
the magnetization µ develops hysteresis yles with negative (lokwise) areas, µcp(η) > µpc(η). We
dene two ritial values of η through the equations µcp(ηcp) = 0 and µpc(ηpc) = 0. In gure 2 we
present a hysteresis yle for a system with a disorder ∆ = 1.5× 10−3.
In gure 3 we present a plot of the right shift in the urve µcp, |ηcp− 2/n| and the left shift in the
urve µpc, |ηpc − 2/n| as a funtion of the disorder ∆. We observe that the right shift in µcp obeys a
saling low proportional to ∆0.8, whilst the left shift in µpc asymptotially approahes µcp for values
of the disorder 1.8× 10−3 ≤ ∆.
We expet to have only one marosopi onservative luster for systems with suiently small
disorder ∆. We found that for systems with disorder ∆ . ∆0 = 1.8 × 10−3 there is mostly only
one onservative luster and the urves µcp(η) as a funtion of x ≡ (η − ηcp(∆))/∆λ and µpc(η) as a
funtion of x ≡ (η−ηpc(∆))/∆λ ollapse into a single funtion when λ ∼ 0.3. This result for systems
with ∆ < ∆0 is presented in gure 4. In the insets we present snapshots of the systems at x = 0.
For larger values of ∆ > ∆0 we have systems that an support more than one onservative luster,
with luster sizes that get smaller, the larger the value of the disorder ∆ (gure 5). The exponent
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Figure 3: Right shift in the urve µcp, |ηcp−2/n| and the left shift in the urve µpc, |ηpc−2/n| as a funtion
of the disorder ∆. The label in the vertial axis is |η⋆ − 2/n| where η⋆ stands for either ηcp or ηpc. The
straight line is the best t for the right shift of µcp, whih is a saling law proportional to ∆
0.8
. The left
shift in µpc asymptotially approahes this behavior for values of ∆ larger than 1.8× 10−3 (indiated by the
dotted line).
for the latter ase is λ ∼ 1.
The area of the hysteresis yle as a funtion of the disorder parameter ∆ is:
A(∆) ≡
˛
dη µ(η,∆)
=
ˆ 1/2+3∆
1/2−3∆
dη [µcp(η,∆)− µpc(η,∆)] .
The hysteresis yle, if approximated by a retangle, should over an area proportional to the disorder
parameter ∆. Therefore the quantity dened as a(∆) ≡ A(∆)/∆ should be a onstant if the yles
are stable for large values of ∆. We expet to see a derement in the area of the yle assoiated with
a derement in the size of the onservative lusters in the µcp path, as ∆ gets larger. The measured
areas obey the following power law a(∆) = A0∆
−λ
with λ = 0.50± 0.02 for values of the disorder in
the range 1×10−4 ≤ ∆ ≤ 1×10−1. the urves µcp and µpc ollapse into eah other and the hysteresis
disappears.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a model of opinion formation in soieties of adaptive agents where there is a set
of rules B that determined what is soially aeptable. We observed that by means of the self-
averaging property of the relevant parameters {Ra} and {Ya,b}, the desription of the system is given
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Figure 4: Data ollapse of µcp as a funtion of x ≡ (η − ηcp(∆))/∆0.3 and µpc as a funtion of x ≡
(η − ηpc(∆))/∆0.3 for several values of ∆ < 1.8 × 10−3. In the inset we have the orrespondent snapshots
of the arrays R at x = 0. In all the ases the number of onservative lusters supported by the system is
mostly 1 (olor on-line).
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Figure 5: Data ollapse of µcp as a funtion of x ≡ (η−ηcp(∆))/∆ and µpc as a funtion of x ≡ (η−ηpc(∆))/∆
for several values of ∆ > 1.8 × 10−3. In the inset we have the orrespondent snapshots of the arrays R at
x = 0. In all the ases the number of onservative lusters supported by the system is larger than one and
the larger the disorder parameter ∆ the smaller the size of the lusters observed (olor on-line).
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by equation (19). In this approximation the soial agents agree in all issues that are soially neutral
(Ya,b = 1). One an suppose that this inter-agent agreement in the hyper-plane perpendiular to
B would add up to a soial onsensus dierent from the imposed by B. To understand this point,
we have to realize that the agreement onveyed by {Ya,b = 1} is partiular to the present opinion
formation proess, and that the soial onsensus B is the integrated result of many similar proesses
previously undergone by the soiety. The rigidity of B is the rigidity observed in the written law
whih, despite the opinion of the individuals on the onjuntural soial issues, must be obeyed and
an only be modied after building up a new, omprehensive onsensus.
By onsidering soial strengths drawn from a Gaussian distribution entered at η and with stan-
dard deviation ∆, the urves we obtained for the overall opinion of the system µ developed hysteresis
yles, as funtions of η. These yles an be assoiated to the delay in the emergene of onservative
lusters in the path from polarized to onsensual behavior. The delay (left shift) in the emergene
of the onservative lusters in the polarized-to-onservative path is due to the relatively large dis-
tane of the polarized initial ondition to the onsensual stable solution of the system (19) and it is
more pronouned for systems that develop only one marosopi onservative luster (see gure 3).
Conservative lusters may have a size equal to the size of the system for small enough disorder and
they derease in size as the value of the disorder ∆ inreases. By studying the areas of the hysteresis
yles, we observed that, for large enough ∆, the urves µcp(η) and µpc(η) ollapsed on eah other
and the yles disappeared. The deay of the relative area of the hysteresis yle was empirially
observed to obey the power law a ∝ ∆−λ with λ = 0.50± 0.02.
These disorder-driven, zero temperature hanges, are very similar to the ones ourring in the
random eld Ising model, as reported in [26℄. Moreover, µcp(η) urves for several values of ∆ have
shown evidene of rakling noise [27℄, as it is observed in the tails of µ ∼ −1 presented in gure 5.
The most relevant eet observed, the emergene of onservative lusters when the average im-
portane to the peers' opinions is inreased, has a lear interpretation in the ontext of opinion
formation. Let us assume we live in a soiety where the status quo B is well established. Suppose
there is evidene in support of an ation against the established order, and in onsequene a poliy is
made to hallenge B. Suh evidene may produe a hange in attitude in the soial members, trying
to orroborate their opinions by ontrasting them with their peers (inrease in η). Suh orrobora-
tion is not sought when there is general onformity with B. Members of the soiety that remain in
agreement with B have the eet of leaders [7℄ and onservative lusters emerge and remain, even if
η is inreased by the emergene of more evidene in favor of the hallenging poliy.
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Appendix A: Dimer
By supposing that the entries of S are iid variables with P(Si = 1) = 12 we an ompute the joint
probability P(β, {φa}) =
´
dSP(β, {φa}|S)P(S). In partiular, for a dimer, i.e. a soiety omposed
by only two agents, and for a large enough N the joint probability P(β, φa, φb) an be omputed
exatly:
P(β, φa, φb) = N
(
β
∣∣Σa,bΛ(φa, φb),Σ2a,b )
N (φb|Wa,bφa, 1−W 2a,b) N (φa) (A1)
P(φa, φb) = 2H (−Λ(φa, φb))
N (φb|Wa,bφa, 1−W 2a,b) N (φa), (A2)
where
Λ(φa, φb) ≡ (Ra −Wa,bRb)φa + (Rb −Wa,bRa)φb
Ωa,b
√
1−W 2a,b
Σ2a,b ≡
Ω2a,b
1−W 2a,b
and where N (x|µ, σ2) is a Gaussian distribution for x entered at µ with variane σ2. We also use
the following notation N (x) ≡ N (x|0, 1), H(x) ≡ ´∞
x
dyN (y) is the Gardner error funtion and
Ω2a,b = (1−R2a)(1−R2b)(1−Y 2a,b). By using (A1) and (A2) we an average out the dependeny on the
training set (through the variables φa, φb and β) in the equations (11) and (12). By using that in
the large system size limit (N →∞) the overlaps {Ra} and {Ya,b} are self-averaging quantities [23℄,
and by optimizing the learning algorithm (1) by taking the limit of f → 0, with ηa,b ≡ limf→0 ga,b/f ,
we have that limN→∞ limf→0 = lim∆t→0 and the evolution of the overlaps is ruled by:
dRa
dt
≡ lim
∆t→0
ˆ
dφadφbdβ P(β, φa, φb)∆Ra
∆t
=
〈
Ψa
(
β˜a,b − φaRa
)〉
,
where the external angular brakets represent expetation over the distribution P(φa, φb) and the
estimated soial post-synapti eld, represented by the onditional average:
β˜a,b ≡
ˆ
dβ β P(β|φa, φb)
= Σa,b [F (Λ(φa, φb)) + Λ(φa, φb)] , (A3)
where F(x) ≡ N (x)/H(−x). By using the results (B6) and (B7) and by re-saling the time by
t→
√
2
π
t, we have that the equation for the vertex variables is:
R˙a = (1− R2a)
2− ηa,b
2
+
+
ηa,b
2
[
(1− R2a)
ϕa,b
π
+ ρa,b (Rb −Wa,bRa)
]
, (A4)
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where
ρa,b ≡ 1
2
− 1
π
arctan
(
Ra −Wa,bRb
Ωa,b
)
. (A5)
In similar manner:
Y˙a,b = (1− Y 2a,b)
[√
1−R2b
1− R2a
ηa,bρa,b + ITb,a
]
. (A6)
Appendix B: Beyond the dimer
To go beyond the dimer we will onsider soieties with M2 members. This allows us to fatorize
the global joint probabilities into fators involving pairs of linked surprise variables and loal soial
post-synapti elds only. This is onsistent with a desription where the agents have aess to
loal information only. From agent a's perspetive, the information available is represented by
the surprise variables {φa, φNa} and the information to be inferred is represented by the loal eld
βa. The probabilities are modeled by P(βa, φa, φNa) =
´ ∏
c∈Na
dβa,cP(βa|βNa)P(βa,c, φa, φc), where
βNa = {βa,c|c ∈ Na}, βa,c is the eld inferred from the knowledge of φa and φc alone and P(βa,b, φa, φb)
is given by (A1). By supposing equal probability a priori: P(βa|βa,Na) = 1|Na|
∑
c∈Na
δ(βa−βa,c), thus
P(βa, φa, φNa) = 1|Na|
∑
c∈Na
P(βa, φa, φc) and
P(βa|φa, φNa) =
∑
c∈Na
P(βa, φa, φc)∑
c∈Na
P(φa, φc)
where P(βa, φa, φc) is given by (A1) and P(φa, φc) by (A2). Therefore the inferred loal eld is:
β˜a ≡
ˆ
dβa
∑
c∈Na
P(βa, φa, φc)βa∑
c∈Na
P(φa, φc)
=
∑
d∈Na
Aa,dβ˜a,d, (B1)
where
Aa,d ≡
H (−Λ(φa, φd)) N
(
φd|Wa,dφa, 1−W 2a,d
)
∑
c∈Na
H (−Λ(φa, φc)) N
(
φc|Wa,cφa, 1−W 2a,c
) .
The distribution N (φc|Wa,cφa, 1−W 2a,c) is sharply piked at φc = Wa,cφa, thus we an estimate the
fator in the sum at the RHS of (B1) by
Aa,d ≈
H(−Raφa
√
1−W 2a,d/Ωa,d)∑
c∈Na
H(−Raφa
√
1−W 2a,c/Ωa,c)
+
+
∑
c∈Na
O(W 2a,c −W 2a,d) +
∑
c∈Na
O(φc −Wa,cφa).
By assuming that Ya,c ≈ 1 for all c ∈ Na (see bellow) we have that 1 ≪
√
1−W 2a,c/Ωa,c, thus
Aa,d ≈ 1/|Na|. Finally we have that: β˜a ≈ 1|Na|
∑
d∈Na
β˜a,d and:
R˙a =
〈
Ψa
(
β˜a − φaRa
)〉
(B2)
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Y˙a,b =
〈
Ψa√
1− R2a
[
φb −Rbβ˜b√
1−R2b
− Ya,bφa −Raβ˜a√
1−R2a
]〉
+
+ITb,a. (B3)
By dening Γa ≡ Ra/
√
1− R2a we an write:
P(φa) ≡ 2H(−Γaφa)N (φa)
P(φc|φa) ≡ H (−Λ(φa, φc))H(−Γaφa) N
(
φc
∣∣Wa,cφa, 1−W 2a,c )
and we an ompute the following integrals:
〈φc −Wa,cφa| φa〉 = Rc −Wa,cRa√
1− R2a
F(Γaφa) (B4)
〈F (Λ(φa, φc))| φa〉 = Σa,c√
1−R2a
F(Γaφa) (B5)
and by dening Ψa,b ≡ 1− ηa,bΘ(−φa)Θ(−φb) we have that
I1 ≡ 〈Ψa,b(φb −Wa,bφa)〉
=
√
2
π
(Rb −Wa,bRa)
[
1− ηa,b
2π
arccos(−Ya,b)
]
+
+
√
2
π
ηa,b
1−W 2a,b
2
ρa,b. (B6)
I2 ≡ 〈Ψa,bF (Λ(φa, φb))〉
=
√
2
π
Σa,b
[
1− ηa,b
2π
arccos(−Ya,b)
]
. (B7)
Therefore
〈
β˜a − φaRa
〉
=
√
2
π
(1− R2a) and
I3 ≡
〈
Θ(−φa)Θ(−φc)
(
β˜a − φaRa
)〉
=
√
2
π
1−R2a
2|Na|
[
π − ϕa,c
π
− Rc −Wa,cRa
1− R2a
ρa,c
]
+
+
|Na| − 1
|Na| )
√
1− R2a 〈Θ(−φa)Θ(−φc)F(Γaφa)〉 . (B8)
To ompute the expetations that appear in the equation of the overlaps Ya,b we observe that the lo-
al learning amplitude and the loal estimated eld an be deomposed into Ψa = Ψa,b−∆Ψa,b, where
∆Ψa,b ≡
∑
c∈Na/b
ηa,cΘ(−φa)Θ(−φc) and β˜a = β˜a,b +∆βa,b where ∆βa,b ≡ 1|Na|
∑
c∈Na/b
(
β˜a,c − β˜a,b
)
.
The equation for the overlaps {Ya,b} an be written as:
Y˙a,b = F
(0)
a,b − F (1)a,b +∆Fa,b
where F
(0)
a,b is idential to the RHS of (14)
F
(1)
a,b ≡
〈
∆Ψa,b√
1−R2a
[
φb − Rbβ˜a,b√
1−R2b
− Ya,bφa − Raβ˜a,b√
1−R2a
]〉
+
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+ITb,a
∆Fa,b ≡
〈
Ψa√
1−R2a
[
Rb∆βb,a√
1− R2b
− Ya,b Ra∆βa,b√
1−R2a
]〉
+
+ITb,a.
F
(1)
a,b = 0 and we onsider ∆Fa,b, the term that aounts for the interation of the learning amplitude
with the ontribution of the neighborhood to the estimate of the loal eld, to be negligible. In suh
a ase the stable solution to the set of equations (B3) is {Ya,b = 1} for all pair of vertexes a and b
sharing a bond.
In suh a ase we have to ompute
I(Ra, Rb) ≡ lim
Y→1
〈Θ(−φa)Θ(−φb)F(Γaφa)〉
whih, by using the denition of the Gardner error funtion and taken the limit inside the remaining
integral, leads to:
I(Ra, Rb) =
√
1− R2a
2π
{
1− 2Θ(Rb −Ra)
ˆ ∞
0
DφH(Da,bφ)H(Raφ)
}
,
where
Da,c ≡ (1− R
2
a)
√
1− R2c +RaRc
√
1−R2a
Rc
√
1− R2a −Ra
√
1−R2c
> Ra.
By dening νa ≡ 1/|Na|, the equation for the vertexes variables beomes:
R˙a = (1−R2a)
{(
1−
∑
c∈Na
ηa,c
2
)
+
+
∑
c∈Na
ηa,cΘ(Rc − Ra)
2
[
νa
Rc − RaWa,c
1− R2a
+
+(1− νa) 2
ˆ ∞
0
DφaH(Da,bφa)H(Raφa)
]}
. (B9)
Observe that equation (B9) is idential to (16) for |Na| = 1.
It is possible to demonstrate that:
Rc −RaWa,c ≥ (1− R2a)2
ˆ ∞
0
DφaH(Da,bφa)H(Raφa)
where the equal sign is satised for Rc = Ra or Rc = 1 only. We an therefore propose an upper
bound for the derivative
R˙a ≤ (1− R2a)
{(
1−
∑
c∈Na
ηa,c
2
)
+
+
∑
c∈Na
ηa,cΘ(Rc −Ra)
2
Rc − RaWa,c
1− R2a
+
}
.
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